Elimination of Wormhole Attacker Node in MANET Using Performance Evaluation Multipath Algorithm by Khainwar, Rajpal Singh et al.
Network and Complex Systems                                                                                                                                                         www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-610X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0603 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.7, 2013 
 
22 
Elimination of Wormhole Attacker Node in MANET Using 
Performance Evaluation Multipath Algorithm 
 
Rajpal Singh Khainwar 
CSE. Deptt., RITS, Bhopal, India. 
rajpalsingh1@gmail.com 
Mr. Anurag Jain 
CSE. Deptt., RITS, Bhopal, India. 
ak.jain@gmail.com 
Mr. Jagdish Prasad Tyagi 
ECE. Deptt., MGCGV, Chitrakoot, India. 
to.jptyagi@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
In MANET, the more security is required in comparison to wired network. Wireless networks are susceptible to 
many attacks, including an attack known as the wormhole attack. The wormhole attack is very powerful, and 
preventing the attack has proven to be very difficult. In wormhole attacks, one malicious node tunnels packets 
from its location to the other malicious node. Such wormhole attacks result in a false route with fewer. If source 
node chooses this fake route, malicious nodes have the option of delivering the packets or dropping them. In this 
paper we specifically considering Wormhole attack. Instead  of  detecting  suspicious routes as  in  previous 
methods,  in this paper we  implement a  new  method which detects malicious nodes and works without 
modification of protocol,  using  a  hop-count  and time delay analysis  from  the users point of view without any 
special environment assumptions. The proposed work is simulated using OPNET and results showing the 
advantages of proposed work. 
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1 Introduction 
A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) comprises nodes that are organized and maintained in a distributed 
manner without a fixed infrastructure. These nodes, such as wireless phones, have a limited transmission range. 
Hence, each node has the ability to communicate directly with another node and forward messages to neighbors 
until the messages arrive at the destination nodes i.e. the  nodes  act  as  both  host  and router  at  the  same  time,  
i.e.,  each  node  in  the  network  can  be  independent. Since the transmission between two nodes has to rely on 
relay nodes, many routing protocols [1, 2, 3, 4] have been proposed for ad hoc networks. In  a  wormhole  attack, 
attackers  “tunnel”  packets  to  another  area  of  the  network  bypassing  normal  routes  as  shown  in Figure 1.  
The resulting route  through  the  wormhole  may have a better  metric,  i.e.,  a  lower  hop-count  than  normal 
routes.  With  this  leverage, attackers  using wormholes can  easily  manipulate  the  routing  priority  in 
MANET to perform eavesdropping, packet modification or perform a DoS (Denial of Service) attack. The entire 
routing system in MANET can even be brought down using the wormhole attack. Its severity and influence has 
been analyzed in [5]. 
 
Fig 1.1 The wormhole attack in MANET 
In wireless network many types of attacks can be initiated but most of them are relative easy to detect because of 
their property of dramatically altering the network statistics but one different type of attack we consider in this 
thesis. It is very important when considering security issues of network, is wormhole attack, which is difficult to 
detect & can harm by directing important data to unauthorized nodes. During the route discovery process, a 
wormhole can relay route request and response messages between distant nodes, creating the appearance of 
shorter routes to destinations. Since the wormhole can be anywhere along a route, a source will have to detect its 
existence somewhere along the route when a node sets up the route (on-demand).  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related works regarding wormhole attacks. Section 3 
presents proposed work. Simulation results and analysis are presented in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion is 
provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Survey  
In this section, we review related works in the literature which discuss proposed wormhole attack defenses.  
Packet Leash [6] is an approach in which some information is added to restrict the maximum 
transmission distance of packet. There are two types of packet leashes: geographic leash and temporal leash. In 
geographic leash, when a node A sends a packet to another node B, the node must include its location 
information and sending time into the packet. B can estimate the distance between them. The geographic leash 
computes an upper bound on the distance, whereas the temporal leash ensures that a packet has an upper bound 
on its lifetime. In temporal leashes, all nodes must have tight time synchronization. The maximum difference 
between any two nodes’ clocks is bounded by ∆, and this value should be known to all the nodes. By using 
metrics, each node checks the expiration time in the packet and determine whether or not wormhole attacks have 
occurred. If a packet receiving time exceed the expiration time, the packet is discarded.  
Unlike Packet Leash, Capkun et al. [7] presented SECTOR, which does not require any clock 
synchronization and location information, by using Mutual Authentication with Distance-Bounding (MAD). 
Node A estimates the distance to another node B in its transmission range by sending it a one-bit challenge, 
which A responds to instantaneously. By using the time of flight, A detects whether or not B is a neighbor or not. 
However, this approach uses special hardware that can respond to a one-bit challenge without any delay as 
Packet leash is. 
Shalini Jain et al. [8] presented a novel trust-based scheme for identifying and isolating nodes that create a 
wormhole in the network without engaging any cryptographic means. With the help of extensive simulations, 
demonstrate that scheme functions effectively in the presence of malicious colluding nodes and does not impose 
any unnecessary conditions upon the network establishment and operation phase. 
In order to avoid the problem of using special hardware, a Round Trip Time (RTT) mechanism [9] is 
proposed by Jane Zhen and Sampalli. The RTT is the time that extends from the Route Request (RREQ) 
message sending time of a node A to Route Reply (RREP) message receiving Time from a node B. A will 
calculate the RTT between A and all its neighbors. Because the RTT between two fake neighbors is higher than 
between two real neighbors, node A can identify both the fake and real neighbors. In this mechanism, each node 
calculates the RTT between itself and all its neighbors. This mechanism does not require any special hardware 
and it is easy to implement; however it cannot detect exposed attacks because fake neighbors are created in 
exposed attacks.  
 Debdutta Barman Roy et al. [10] presented a cluster based counter-measure for the wormhole attack;   
Routing security in ad hoc networks is often equated with strong and feasible node authentication and 
lightweight cryptography. Unfortunately, the wormhole attack can hardly be defeated by crypto graphical 
measures, as wormhole attackers do not create separate packets. They simply replay packets already existing on 
the network, which pass the cryptographic checks. Existing works on wormhole detection have often focused on 
detection using specialized hardware, such as directional antennas, etc. alleviates these drawbacks and efficiently 
mitigates the wormhole attack in MANET.  In this a cluster based counter-measure for the wormhole attack that 
alleviates these drawbacks and efficiently mitigates the wormhole attack in MANET. 
Khalil et al. [11] introduces LITEWORP in which they used the notion of guard node. The guard node can 
detect the wormhole if one of its neighbors is behaving maliciously. The guard node is a common neighbor of 
two nodes to detect a legitimate link between them. In a sparse network, however, it is not always possible to 
find a guard node for a particular link. 
Sun Choi et al. [12] presented an effective method called Wormhole Attack Prevention (WAP) without 
using specialized hardware. In WAP All nodes monitor its neighbor’s behavior when they send RREQ messages 
to the destination by using a special list called Neighbor List. When a source node receives some RREP 
messages, it can detect a route under wormhole attack among the routes. Once wormhole node is detected, 
source node records them in the Wormhole Node List. Even though malicious nodes have been excluded from 
routing in the past, the nodes have a chance of attack once more. Therefore, we store the information of 
wormhole nodes at the source node to prevent them taking part in routing again. 
However, most of these mechanisms require some special assumptions and supporting hardware, and some of 
them are based on specific protocols. 
 
3. Proposed Work 
In this method we specifically consider Wormhole attack which does not require exploiting any nodes in the 
network and interfere with the route establishment process.  Instead  of  detecting  suspicious routes  as  in  
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previous methods,  We  implement  a  new  method which detects the attacker nodes and works without 
modification of protocol,  using  a  hop-count  and time delay analysis from the viewpoint of users without any 
special environment assumptions. The proposed work is simulated using OPNET and results showing the 
advantages of proposed work. The steps of modeling in FSM (Finite State Machine) of Proposed Algorithm are 
as follows:  
Step1. Randomly Generate a Number in between 0 to maximum number of nodes. 
Step2. Make the Node with same number as transmitter node. 
Step3. Generate the Route from selected transmitting node to any destination node with specified average route 
length. 
Step4. Send packet According to selected destination and start timer to count hops and delay.  
Step5. Repeat the process and store routes and their hops and delay. 
Step6. Now if the hop count for a particular route decreases abruptly for average hop count then at least one 
node in the route must be attacker.   
Step7. Now check the delay of all previous routes which involve any on node of the suspicious route. Now the 
node not encounter previously should be malicious let there are N such nodes. 
Step8. In N == 1 then it is the attacker else wait for future sequences which shows deviation and involve only 
one of N nodes.   
Step9. These nodes are black listed by the nodes hence they are not involved in future routes. 
Step10.  Whole process (from step1 to step9) is repeated until we didn’t get the specified goal (goal can be  
1. To get complete list of malicious nodes.  
2. To run for specified time. 
3. To run for specific number of packets etc.   
 
4. Implementation and Results 
Validation of the proposed algorithm is performed by simulating it on network simulation software OPNET 14.0. 
For the evaluation of practical feasibility & effectiveness of the proposed algorithm we generated many 
scenarios for analysis of the system under all practically possible conditions. Some of the major analysis 
parameters for which scenarios designed are: 
(i) How the algorithm works with High (50) Nodes density with varying number of attackers. 
(ii) Effect of algorithm under different traffic conditions. 
(iii) Effect of algorithm for different probability distribution for node packet generation & inter arrival time 
4.1 Simulation Environment and Parameters: 
The effectiveness of our protocol to detect wormhole attacks is evaluated in this section using extensive 
simulations. We have performed the simulation of the proposed scheme in Opnet Network Modeler 14.0 to 
prove practical efficiency of the method. The radio model corresponds to the 802.11 Wave LAN, operating at a 
maximum air-link rate of 11 Mbps. CBR traffic pattern is used. 
4.1.1 Parameters 
No. of Nodes                                           50 
No. of Malicious Nodes                           6 
Data Rate                                                 11 Mbps. 
Area                                                          10 square Km. 
Routing Protocol                                      AODV 
Traffic Model                                           CBR 
MAC                                                        IEEE 802.11 
 Mobility                                                   Random    
Packet inter arrival time                           1sec. constant 
Packet size                                                1024 bits 
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4.1.2 RF Transmitter Properties 
 
Fig 4.1 
4.1.3 RF Receiver Properties 
 
Fig 4.2 
4.2 Simulation Results 
The simulation results from Opnet Network Modeler 14.0   with respect to the Average Hop count per route and 
Average delay per route in different scenario.  
4.2.1 Scenario 1:- 50 Nodes distribution without wormhole attack:  
 
Fig 4.3 
Initial distribution of the nodes which is almost uniform this scenario is for high node density system with no 
wormhole attack.  
4.2.1.1 Average Hop count per route in scenario 1 without wormhole attack 
 
 
Fig 4.4 
Average Hop count per route show’s that under high node density conditions created scenario having average 
route length of 7.5 & will be used as reference for attack indicator.  
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4.2.1.2 Average delays per route in scenario 4 without wormhole attack 
 
Fig 4.5 
Average delay per route show’s that under normal conditions created scenario having average delay per route2.5 
& will be used as reference for attack indicator.  
4.2.2 Scenario 2:- 50 Nodes distribution with wormhole attack 
 
Fig 4.6 
Initial distribution of the nodes which is almost uniform this scenario is for high node density system with 
wormhole attack. The scenario having a attacking tunnel between highlighted nodes.   
4.2.2.1 Average Hop count per route in scenario 2 with wormhole attack 
 
Fig 4.7 
With no Prevention to attack, the graph shows decrease in average hop count. In Present scenario Average hop 
count per route decrease from 7.5 to 6.5 
4.2.2.2 Average delays per route in scenario 2 with wormhole attack 
 
Fig 4.8 
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Average delay per route in scenario 2 shows Significant in delay because of involvement of attacker. 
4.2.3 Scenario 3:- 50 Nodes distribution with wormhole attack and applied proposed Algorithm 
 
Fig 4.9 
Initial distribution of the nodes which is almost uniform this scenario is for high node density system with 
wormhole attack. The scenario having an attacking tunnel between highlighted nodes, and applied proposed 
algorithm of them. 
4.2.3.1 Average Hop count per route in scenario 3 with wormhole attack and applied proposed Algorithm 
 
Fig 4.9 
Average Hop count per route in scenario 6 increase in average hop count indicates that now the nodes avoiding 
attacker’s path with very effectively.   
4.2.3.2 Average delays per route in scenario 6 with wormhole attack and applied proposed algorithm 
 
 
Fig 4.10 
Average delays per route in scenario 3 the delay is again setting to original evaluating as in without attack 
scenario. 
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4.2.4 Average Hop count per route comparison in 50 nodes 
 
Fig 4.11 
Attack reduces the average hop count by 13% (shown in blue) from normal condition (shown in green) which 
shows the selection of attaching node in route, the proposed algorithm significantly regains the hop counts by 
avoiding the attacker (shown in red).    
 
4.2.5 Average delays per route comparison in 50 nodes 
 
Fig 4.12 
Attack reduces the average delay by 48% (shown in blue) from normal condition (shown in green) which shows 
the shorting of route by attacking route, the proposed algorithm have much better delay which presents the 
elimination of attacker (shown in red).    
 
5. Conclusion 
Our method provides good performance for detecting wormhole attacker nodes and works without modification 
of protocol, using a hop-count and time delay analysis from the viewpoint of users, without any special 
environment assumptions. When the nodes found malicious behavior then these nodes are black listed by the 
source node hence they are not involved in future routes. Our method provides good performance for high node 
density system compare to average and low density system.  
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